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Abstract. Deep learning models are being integrated into a wide range
of high-impact, security-critical systems, from self-driving cars to medi-
cal diagnosis. However, recent research has demonstrated that many of
these deep learning architectures are vulnerable to adversarial attacks—
highlighting the vital need for defensive techniques to detect and mitigate
these attacks before they occur. To combat these adversarial attacks,
we developed UnMask, an adversarial detection and defense framework
based on robust feature alignment. The core idea behind UnMask is to
protect these models by verifying that an image’s predicted class (“bird”)
contains the expected robust features (e.g., beak, wings, eyes). For ex-
ample, if an image is classified as “bird”, but the extracted features are
wheel, saddle and frame, the model may be under attack. UnMask de-
tects such attacks and defends the model by rectifying the misclassifica-
tion, re-classifying the image based on its robust features. Our extensive
evaluation shows that UnMask (1) detects up to 96.75% of attacks, with
a false positive rate of 9.66% and (2) defends the model by correctly clas-
sifying up to 93% of adversarial images produced by the current strongest
attack, Projected Gradient Descent, in the gray-box setting. UnMask
provides significantly better protection than adversarial training across 8
attack vectors, averaging 31.18% higher accuracy. Our proposed method
is architecture agnostic and fast. We open source the code repository and
data with this paper: https://github.com/unmaskd/unmask.
Keywords: deep learning, adversarial defense, robust features, adver-
sarial detection
1 Introduction
In the past few years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown significant sus-
ceptibility to adversarial perturbation [14,30]. More recently, a wide range of ad-
versarial attacks have been developed to defeat deep learning systems [3,6,21]—in
some cases by changing the value of only a few pixels [29]. The ability of these
micro perturbations to confuse deep learning architectures highlights a critical
issue with modern computer vision systems—that these deep learning systems
do not distinguish objects in ways that humans would [4,17].
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
09
57
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
1 F
eb
 20
20
2 Freitas et al.
"Bird"
(Attacked)
Bicycle
(Correctly Classified)
Bird
(Misclassified)
Similarity Comparison
Wheel
Frame
Saddle Handlebar
Pedal
Object Detector
Extracts Features
Vulnerable Model
Feature Mismatch
Attack Detected
Attack Detection1 Rectification2
UNMASK Unmasking Attacks using Robust Feature Alignment
Fig. 1. UnMask Framework Overview. UnMask combats adversarial attacks (in red)
through extracting robust features from an image (“Bicycle” at top), and comparing
them to expected features of the classification (“Bird” at bottom) from the unprotected
model. Low feature overlap signals an attack. UnMask rectifies misclassification using
the image’s extracted features. Our approach detects 96.75% of gray-box attacks (at
9.66% false positive rate) and defends the model by correctly classifying up to 93% of
adversarial images crafted by Projected Gradient Descent (PGD).
For example, when humans see a bicycle, we see its handlebar, frame, wheels,
saddle, and pedals (Fig. 1, top). Through our visual perception and cognition,
we synthesize these detection results with our knowledge to determine that we
are actually seeing a bicycle. However, when an image of a bicycle is adversari-
ally perturbed to fool the model into misclassifying it as a bird (by manipulating
pixels), to humans, we still see the bicycle’s robust features (e.g., handlebar).
On the other hand, the attacked model fails to perceive these robust features,
and is tricked into misclassifying the image. How do we incorporate this intu-
itive detection capability natural to human beings, into deep learning models to
protect them from harm?
It was recently posited that adversarial vulnerability is a consequence of a
models’ sensitivity to well-generalizing features in the data [20,32]. Since models
are trained to maximize accuracy, they use any available information to achieve
this goal. This often results in the use of human incomprehensible features, since
a “head” or “wheel” is as natural to a classifier as any other predictive feature.
These human incomprehensible (non-robust) features, while useful for improving
accuracy, can lead to the creation of adversarially vulnerable models [20]. We
extend this notion of adversarial vulnerability as a consequence of non-robust
features and develop a framework that protects against adversarial attacks by
incorporating human priors into the traditional classification pipeline.
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1.1 Contributions
1. Robust Feature Extraction. We contribute the idea that robust feature
alignment offers a powerful, explainable and practical method of detecting and
defending against adversarial perturbations in deep learning models. A signifi-
cant advantage of our proposed concept is that while an attacker may be able
to manipulate the class label by subtly changing pixel values, it is much more
challenging to simultaneously manipulate all the individual features that jointly
compose the image. We demonstrate that by adapting an object detector, we
can effectively extract higher-level robust features contained in images to detect
and defend against adversarial perturbations. (Section 3.1)
2. UnMask: Detection & Defense Framework. Building on our core con-
cept of robust feature alignment, we propose UnMask as a framework to detect
and defeat adversarial attacks by quantifying the similarity between the image’s
extracted features with the expected features of its predicted class. To illustrate
how UnMask works, we use the example from Figure 1, where a bicycle image
has been attacked such that it would fool an unprotected model into misclas-
sifying it as a bird. For a real “bird” image, we would expect to see features
such as beak, wing and tail. However, UnMask would (correctly) extract bike
features: wheel, frame, and pedals. UnMask quantifies the similarity between
the extracted features (of a bike) with the expected features (of a bird), in this
case zero. This comparison gives us the dual ability to both detect adversarial
perturbations by selecting a similarity threshold for which we classify an image
as adversarial, and to defend the model by predicting a corrected class that
best matches the extracted features. (Section 3.2)
3. Extensive Evaluation. We extensively evaluate UnMask’s effectiveness
using the large UnMaskDataset that we have newly curated, with over 21k
images in total. We test multiple factors, including: 4 strong attacks; 2 attack
strength levels; 2 popular CNN architectures; and multiple combinations of vary-
ing numbers of classes and feature overlaps. Experiments demonstrate that our
approach detects up to 96.75% of gray-box attacks with a false positive rate of
9.66% and (2) defends the model by correctly classifying up to 93% of adver-
sarial images crafted by Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). UnMask provides
significantly better protection than adversarial training across 8 attack vectors,
averaging 31.18% higher accuracy. (Section 4)
4. Reproducible Research: Open-source Code & Dataset. We contribute
a new dataset incorporating PASCAL-Part [7], PASCAL VOC 2010 [12], a sub-
set of ImageNet [9] and images scraped from Flickr—which we call the Un-
MaskDataset. The goal of this dataset is extend the PASCAL-Part and PAS-
CAL VOC 2010 dataset in two ways—(1) by adding 9,236 and 6,592 man-
ually evaluated images from a subset of ImageNet and Flickr, respectively;
and (2) by converting PASCAL-Part to the standard Microsoft COCO for-
mat [25] for easier use and adoption by the research community. Furthermore,
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we release this new dataset along with our code and models on GitHub, at
https://github.com/unmaskd/unmask.
Throughout this paper, we follow standard notation and use capital bold
letters for matrices (e.g., A), lower-case bold letters for vectors (e.g., a) and
calligraphic font for sets (e.g., S).
2 Background and Related Work
Adversarial attacks typically operate in one of three threat models—(i) white-
box, (ii) gray-box or (iii) black-box. In the (i) white-box setting, everything
about the model and defense techniques is visible to the attacker, allowing them
to tailor attacks to individual neural networks and defense techniques. This
is the hardest scenario for the defender since the adversary is aware of every
countermeasure. In (ii) the gray-box threat model, we assume that the attacker
has access to the classification model but no information on the defense measures.
In (iii) the black-box setting, we assume that the attacker has no access to
the classification model or the defense techniques. This is the most difficult,
and realistic scenario for the attacker since they typically have limited access
to the model’s inner workings. Despite this disadvantage, recent research has
shown that it’s possible for adversaries to successfully craft perturbations for
deep learning models in the black-box setting [2,19,28].
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
There exists a large body of adversarial attack research. We provide a brief
background on the attacks we use to probe the robustness of the UnMask
detection and defense framework. We assume that all attack models operate in
a gray-box setting, where the attacker has full knowledge of the classification
model, but no knowledge of the defensive measures. We focus on untargeted
attacks in all of the experiments.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [26] finds an adversarial example Xp
by iteratively maximizing the loss function J(Xp, y) for T iterations, where J is
the cross-entropy loss.
X(t+1)p = X
(t)
p +Πτ
[
 · sign
{
∇
X
(t)
p
J(X(t)p , y)
}]
(1)
Here X(0)p = X and at every step t, the previous perturbed input X
(t−1)
p
is modified with the sign of the gradient of the loss, multiplied by  (attack
strength). Πτ is a function that clips the input at the positions where it exceeds
the predefined L∞ (or L2) bound τ . We select PGD since it’s one of the strongest
first order attacks [26].
MI-FGSM (MIA) [11] is a gradient-based attack utilizing momentum, where
it accumulates the gradients gt of the first t iterations with a decay factor µ.
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g(t+1) = µ · g(t) +
∇
X
(t)
p
J(X(t)p , y)
||∇
X
(t)
p
J(X(t)p , y)||1
(2)
X(t+1)p = X
(t)
p +Πτ
[
α · sign(g(t+1))
]
(3)
Here α = T , which controls the attack strength. The gradient accumu-
lation (momentum) helps alleviate the trade-off between attack strength and
transferability—demonstrated by winning the NIPS 2017 Targeted and Non-
Targeted Adversarial Attack competitions.
2.2 Adversarial Defense & Detection
Many methods have been proposed to combat attacks, we discuss a few that our
relevant to our work below.
Adversarial training seeks to vaccinate deep learning models to adversarial
image perturbations by modifying the model’s training process to include exam-
ples of attacked images [22,31]. The idea is that the model will learn to classify
these adversarial examples correctly if enough data is seen. It is one of the current
state-of-the-art defenses in the white-box setting. When the adversarial examples
are crafted by PGD, it is known to improve robustness even against other types
of attacks, because PGD is the strongest first-order attack and approximately
finds the hardest examples to train [26]. The adversarial training process can
be seen in the equation 4 below, where we utilize the adversarial perturbations
generated by equation 1.
min
W
[
E(X,y)∼D
(
max
δ∈S
L(W ,X + δ, y)
)]
(4)
The downside to this technique is that it requires a large amount of data
and training time; in addition, it does not incorporate a human prior into the
training process.
Adversarial detection attempts to determine whether or not an input is
benign or adversarial. This has been studied from multiple perspectives us-
ing a variety of techniques, from topological subgraph analysis [13] to image
processing [24,34,35], and hidden/output layer activation distribution informa-
tion [5,23,27].
3 UnMask: Detection and Defense Framework
UnMask is a new method for protecting deep learning models from adversarial
attacks by using robust features that semantically align with human intuition
to combat adversarial perturbations (Figure 1). The objective is to defend a
vulnerable deep learning model M (Figure 1, bottom) using our UnMask
defense framework D (Figure 1, top), where the adversary has full access to
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M but is unaware of the defense strategy D, constituting a gray-box attack on
the overall classification pipeline [8]. In developing the UnMask framework for
adversarial detection and defense, we address three sub-problems:
1. Identify robust features by training a model K that takes as input, input
space X and maps it to a set of robust features F = {K : X → R}.
2. Detect if input space X is benign (+1) or adversarially perturbed (-1) by
creating a binary classifier C : F → {±1} that utilizes robust features F .
3. Defend against adversarial attacks by developing a classifier C : F → y to
predict class label y using robust features F .
Below, we present our solution to problem 1 in Section 3.1; and discuss how
to solve problems 2 and 3 in Section 3.2
3.1 Identifying Adversarially Robust Features That Align With
Human Intuition
In order to discuss adversarially robust features, we categorize features into three
distinct types: p-useful, (ii) γ-robust, and (iii) useful but non-robust [20].
For a distribution D, a feature is defined as p-useful (p > 0) if it is correlated
with the true label in expectation (Eq. 5). These p-useful features are important
for obtaining high accuracy classifiers.
E
(X,y)∼D
[y · f(X)] ≥ p (5)
A feature is referred to as a robust feature (γ-robust) if that feature remains
useful (γ > 0) under a set of allowable adversarial perturbations δ ∈ S. This is
defined in Equation 6.
E
(X,y)∼D
[
inf
δ∈S
y · f(X + δ)
]
≥ γ (6)
Lastly, a useful but non-robust feature is a feature that is p-useful for some
p > 0 but not γ-robust for any γ ≥ 0. These non-robust features are useful for
obtaining high accuracy classifiers, but can be detrimental in the presence of an
adversary since they are often weakly correlated with the label and can be easily
perturbed.
When training a classifier, minimizing classification loss makes no distinction
between robust and non-robust features—it only distinguishes whether a feature
is p-useful. This causes a model to utilize useful but non-robust features in
order to improve classifier accuracy. However, in the presence of adversarial
perturbation, these useful but non-robust features become anti-correlated with
the label and lead to misclassification. On the other hand, if a model is trained
from purely robust features, it has lower classification performance; but gains
non-trivial adversarial robustness [20].
Our goal is to enable a model M to use both γ-robust and useful but non-
robust features to achieve the highest possible classification accuracy, while uti-
lizing only the γ-robust features to determine if an image is attacked. This
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allows model M to use any signal in the data to improve classification accu-
racy, while the defense framework uses only the robust features to provide a
safeguard against adversarial perturbations. In order to determine the γ-robust
features from an input space X, we develop model K to identify robust features
by training on a robust distribution DˆR that satisfies Equation 7.
E
(X,y)∼DˆR
[f(X) · y] =
 E(X,y)∼D[f(X) · y] if f ∈ F0, otherwise (7)
Here F represents the set of human-level robust features identified in the
Pascal-Part dataset using segmentation masks. Ideally, we want these human-
level features to be as useful as the original distribution D, while excluding
the useful but non-robust features. Using robust dataset DˆR, we train a robust
feature extraction model K with weights W to recognize only the human-level
robust features using Equation 8.
min
W
[
E(X,y)∼DˆRL(X, y)
]
(8)
From a practical standpoint, we adopt a Mask R-CNN architecture [15] for
feature extraction model K. We considered multiple approaches, but decided to
use Mask R-CNN for its ability to leverage image segmentation masks to learn
and identify coherent image regions that closely resemble robust features that
would appear semantically and visually meaningful to humans. Different from
conventional image classification models or object detectors, the annotations
used to train our robust feature extractor K are segmented object parts instead
of the whole objects. For example, for the wheel feature, an instance of training
data would consist of a bike image and a segmentation mask indicating which
region of that image represents a wheel. Technically, this means K uses only a
part of an image, and not the whole image, for training. Furthermore, while an
image may consist of multiple image parts, K treats them independently.
3.2 Robust Features For Detection and Defense
Leveraging the robust features extracted from model K, we introduce UnMask
as a detection and defense framework (D). For an unprotected model M (Fig-
ure 1, bottom), an adversary crafts an attacked image by carefully manipulating
its pixel values using an adversarial technique (e.g., PGD [26]). This attacked
image then fools model M into misclassifying the image, as shown in Figure 1.
To guard against this kind of attack on M , we use our UnMask defense frame-
work D in conjunction with the robust feature extraction model K (Figure 1,
top). Model K processes the same image, which may be benign or attacked, and
extracts the robust features from the image to compare to the images’ expected
features. Figure 1 shows an example, where an attacked bike image has fooled the
unprotected model M to classify it as a bird. We would expect the robust features
to include head, claw, wing, and tail. However, from the same (attacked) image,
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Algorithm 1: UnMask
Input: Data distribution D, unprotected model M , class-feature matrix V ,
input space Xt, threshold t
Result: adversarial prediction z ∈ {−1, 1}, predicted class p
E
(X,y)∼DˆR
[f(X) · y] =
 E(X,y)∼D[f(X) · y] if f ∈ F0, otherwise (create DˆR)
K = min
W
[
E(X,y)∼DˆRL(X, y)
]
; (train feature extraction model K)
fr = K(Xt); (extracted features)
fe = V [M(Xt)]; (expected features)
Detection:
s = JS(fr, fe); d = 1− s; (JS = Jaccard similarity)
z =
{
+1 (benign), if d < t
−1 (adversarial), if d ≥ t
Defense:
p =
{
yˆ, if z = +1
argmin
c∈C
JS(fe,V [c]), if z = −1
return z, p;
UnMask’s model K extracts wheels, handle and seat. Comparing the set of ex-
pected features and the actual extracted features (which do not overlap in this
example), UnMask determines the image was attacked, and predicts its class
to be bike based on the extracted features. This robust feature alignment forges
a layer of protection around a model by disrupting the traditional pixel-centric
attack [3,26,29]. This forces the adversary to solve a more complex problem of
manipulating both the class label and all of the image’s constituent parts. For
example, in Figure 1 the attacker needs to fool the defensive layer into misclas-
sifying the bike as a bird by, (1) changing the class label and (2) manipulating
the robust bike features (wheel, seat, handlebar) into bird features.
Below, we detail UnMask’s technical operations and algorithm for detection
and defense (Algorithm 1). The major steps are:
1. Classify input space X to obtain prediction yˆ from (unprotected) model M ,
i.e., yˆ = M(X). At this point, UnMask does not know if X is adversarial or
not.
2. Extract robust features of X using robust feature extraction model K
fr = K(X), where fr ⊆ F . Armed with these robust features fr, UnMask can
detect if model M is under attack, and rectify misclassification caused by the
attack.
UnMask: Adversarial Detection and Defense 9
3. Detect attack. UnMask measures the similarity between the set of robust
extracted features fr and the set of expected features fe = V [yˆ]—where V is the
feature matrix in Table A4 (see Appendix)—by calculating the Jaccard similarity
score s = JS(fe, fa). If distance score d = 1 − s is greater than threshold
parameter t, inputX is deemed benign, otherwise adversarial. Adjusting t would
allow us to assess the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity, which we
describe in detail in Section 4.
4. Defend and rectify. Determining an input to be adversarial also means that
model M is under attack and is giving unreliable classification output. Thus, we
need to rectify the misclassification. UnMask accomplishes this by comparing
the robust extracted features fr to every set of class features in V , outputting
class yˆ that contains the highest feature similarity score s, where 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
4 Evaluation
We extensively evaluate UnMask’s effectiveness in defending and detecting
adversarial perturbations using: 4 strong attacks across two strength levels; 2
popular CNN architectures as unprotected models M ; multiple combinations of
varying numbers of classes and feature overlaps; and benchmarking UnMask
against one of the strongest adversarial defenses—adversarial training [26].
4.1 Experiment Setup
Software and Hardware We develop all experiment code in Python 3.6 on
Linux. We use open-source libraries Keras, Tensorflow, PyTorch, Advertorch [10]
and Matterport [1]; and GPUs that include two Nvidia Titan X’s, a Titan RTX
and a Titan DGX.
Adversarial Attacks We evaluate UnMask against three attacks, detailing
the parameter selection below (Section 2 details each attack vector):
– PGD-L∞ is one of the strongest first-order attacks [26]. Its key parameter
 represents how much each pixel may be changed by PGD in intensity. For
example, =4 means changing up to 4 units of intensity (out of 255). It is
common to evaluate  up to 16 [8,22] (as perturbation becomes visible), with
a stepsize of 2.0 and 20 iterations [26].
– PGD-L2 we also evaluate PGD in the L2 norm, which bounds the  per-
turbation across the whole image, instead of a per-pixel bound as in the L∞
norm. Since the perturbation is bounded across the whole image,  is naturally
larger—typically ranging from 300-900 [33].
– MI-FGSM L∞ (MIA-L∞) is a strong, gradient-based attack, where the key
parameters are µ and  (see PGD-L∞). We set the decay factor µ=1, as it
provides the most effective attack [11].
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Experimental Setup PASCAL-Part VOC+Net Flickr
Model Class set Classes Parts Overlap Train Val Test Train Val Test
K - 44 - - 7,457 930 936 - - -
M
CS3a 3 29 6.89% - - - 7,780 1,099 2,351
CS3b 3 18 50.00% - - - 9,599 1,339 2,867
CS5a 5 34 23.53% - - - 11,639 1,477 3,179
CS5b 5 34 29.41% - - - 13,011 1,928 4,129
Table 1: Number of images used to train and evaluate models K (extraction),
M (vulnerable) and defense framework D. We train model K on PASCAL-Part
dataset, and model M on PASCAL VOC 2010 plus a subset of ImageNet. Four
class sets are investigated in the evaluation, with varying number of classes and
feature overlap. We evaluate model M and defense framework D on Flickr.
– MI-FGSM L2 (MIA-L2) we also evaluate MI-FGSM in the L2 norm, which
bounds the  perturbation across the whole image, instead of a per-pixel
bound as in the L∞ norm (see PGD-L2).
Adversarial Training We benchmark UnMask against adversarial training,
one of the strongest adversarial defense techniques. To select the appropriate
value of —which controls the perturbation strength of adversarial training—we
follow standard procedure and determine  on a per-dataset basis (class set) [26].
Correctly setting this parameter is critical since a small  value will have no effect
on robustness, while too high a value will lead to poor benign accuracy. We
conduct a line search across ={1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 16} and select =4 since it provides
the best performance for each class set (e.g., cs3a, cs5b), as measured by the
average validation accuracy across all attacks (and benign). Line search results
are shown in Fig. A4 and Fig. A5 of Appendix 2. In addition, since our UnMask
is model agnostic, in practice it can be used alongside adversarial training.
UnMaskDataset We curated the UnMaskDataset for our evaluation, which
consists of four component datasets—PASCAL-Part, PASCAL VOC 2010, a
subset of ImageNet and images scraped from Flickr (Table 1). To ensure the
Flickr images are not duplicates, we compare the perceptual hash of each Flickr
image to ImageNet and VOC’10. The goal of this curation is to (i) collect all the
data used in our evaluation as a single source for use by the research community,
and (ii) to increase the number of images available for evaluating the performance
of the deep learning models and the UnMask defense framework. We designed
multiple class sets with varying number of classes and feature overlap (e.g.,
CS3a, in Table 3; and Table A4), to study how they affect detection and defense
effectiveness. We call each combination of class count and feature overlap a “class
set”, abbreviated as “CS.” CS3 thus means a class set with 3 classes. CS3a and
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CS3b have the same number of classes, with different feature overlap. We further
discuss the utilization of data below.
Training Robust Feature Extraction Model K As illustrated in Figure 1,
the robust feature extraction model K takes an image as input (e.g., bike) and
outputs a set of features (e.g., wheel,...). To train K, we use the PASCAL-Part
dataset [7], which consists of 180,423 feature segmentation masks over 9,323 im-
ages across the 44 robust features. The original dataset contains very fine-grained
features, such as 18 types of “legs” (e.g., right front lower leg, left back upper
leg), while for our purposes we only need the abstraction of “leg”. Therefore, we
combined these fine-grained features into more generalized ones (shown as rows
in Table A4). See the Appendix for additional details.
We followed a similar procedure described in [1], training K for 40 epochs.
We use a ratio of 80/10/10 for training, validating and testing the model respec-
tively (see Table 1). Our work is the first adaptation of Mask R-CNN model for
the PASCAL-Part dataset. As such, there are no prior results for comparison.
We computed model K’s mean Average Precision (mAP), which estimates K’s
ability to extract features. The model attains an mAP of 0.56, in line with Mask
R-CNN on other datasets [15]. Model K processes up to 4 images per second
with a single Nvidia Titan X, matching the speeds reported in [1]. This speed
can be easily raised through parallelism by using more GPUs. As robust feature
extraction is the most time-intensive process of the UnMask framework, its
speed is representative of the overall speed of the framework.
Training Unprotected Model M As described in Section 3, M is the model
under attack, and is what UnMask aims to protect. In practice, the choice of
architecture for M and the data it is trained on are determined by the appli-
cation. Here, our evaluation studies two popular deep learning architectures —
ResNet50 [16] and DenseNet121 [18]—however, UnMask supports other archi-
tectures. Training these models from scratch is generally computationally ex-
pensive and requires large amount of data. To reduce such need for computation
Class Set Number of Images Evaluated
PGD-L∞ PGD-L2 MIA-L∞ MIA-L2
CS3a 3,648 4,702 4,702 4,702
CS3b 4,652 5,732 5,734 5,734
CS5a 5,412 6,358 6,358 6,358
CS5b 6,822 8,256 8,258 8,258
Table 2: Number of images used to evaluate the detection capability of UnMask.
Only images that are successfully attacked are used for evaluation (combined
with their benign counterparts), thus the variations in numbers. We report values
for PGD and MIA with =16/600, respectively. Numbers are similar for =8/300.
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and data, we adopt the approach described in [1], where we leverage a model
pre-trained on ImageNet images, and replace its dense layers (i.e., the fully con-
nected layers) to enable us to work with various class sets (e.g., CS3a). Refer to
Table 1, for a breakdown of the data used for training and evaluation.
4.2 Evaluating UnMask Defense and Detection
The key research questions that our evaluation aims to address is how effective
UnMask can (1) detect adversarial images, and (2) defend against attacks
by rectifying misclassification through inferring the actual class label. We use
scraped Flickr data (see Table 1) to obtain a large number of unseen images
matching our class sets. We note that the evaluation is focused on images con-
taining a single-class (i.e., no “person” and “car” in same image) as this allows
for a more controlled environment.
Evaluating Defense and Rectification As the defense evaluation focus is
on rectifying misclassification, our test images have a contamination level of
1—meaning all of the images are adversarial. Comparing UnMask to adver-
sarial training (AT), we find that utilizing robust features that semantically
align with human intuition provides a significant improvement over γ-robust
features learned through adversarial training. We begin with a high-level anal-
ysis in Figure 2, comparing UnMask to adversarial training (“AT”) and no
defense (“None”). UnMask’s robust feature alignment performs 31.18% better
than adversarial training and 74.44% than no defense when averaged across 8
attack vectors and all class sets (see Figure 2).
In Table 3, we analyze the information contained in Figure 2 in detail. One
key observation is that feature overlap is a dominant factor in determining the
accuracy of the UnMask defense, as opposed to the number of classes. When
examining the ResNet50 model on MIA-L∞ (=8), class set CS3b (3 classes;
feature overlap 50%), UnMask is able to determine the underlying class 77%
of the time. At class set CS5a (5 classes; feature overlap 23.53%) an accuracy
of 79% is obtained, highlighting the important role that feature overlap plays in
None
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UM
CS3a
26%Higher
77%Higher
CS3b
35%
74%
CS5a
34%
76%
CS5b
29%
71%
100
75
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25
0A
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)
Fig. 2. Accuracies (in %) for each class set averaged across all attack vectors, strengths,
and models from Table 3. On average, UnMask (UM) performs 31.18% better than
adversarial training (AT) and 74.44% than no defense (None).
UnMask: Adversarial Detection and Defense 13
Setup No Attk PGD-L∞ PGD-L∞ PGD-L2 PGD-L2
 = 8  = 16  = 300  = 600
M CS None AT UM None AT UM None AT UM None AT UM None AT UM
R
e
sN
e
t 3a .98 .96 .94 .31 .71 .85 .22 .50 .72 .07 .86 .92 .00 .67 .91
3b .97 .94 .92 .24 .63 .82 .19 .47 .68 .01 .75 .89 .00 .31 .85
5a .97 .92 .93 .17 .51 .82 .15 .24 .66 .00 .79 .91 .00 .57 .89
5b .97 .92 .91 .22 .56 .78 .17 .34 .61 .04 .78 .88 .00 .50 .84
D
e
n
se
N
e
t 3a .97 .95 .94 .31 .70 .86 .24 .48 .74 .02 .86 .93 .00 .71 .91
3b .97 .93 .92 .25 .60 .82 .23 .44 .67 .02 .79 .89 .00 .46 .85
5a .97 .90 .93 .22 .51 .82 .18 .27 .66 .03 .77 .91 .00 .54 .88
5b .97 .92 .91 .24 .55 .79 .21 .28 .62 .02 .81 .89 .00 .58 .85
Setup No Attk MIA-L∞ MIA-L∞ MIA-L2 MIA-L2
 = 8  = 16  = 300  = 600
M CS None AT UM None AT UM Non AT UM None AT UM None AT UM
R
e
sN
e
t 3a .98 .96 .94 .00 .22 .82 .00 .00 .68 .01 .86 .92 .00 .68 .91
3b .97 .94 .92 .00 .02 .77 .00 .00 .63 .00 .68 .89 .00 .29 .85
5a .97 .92 .93 .00 .25 .79 .00 .02 .63 .00 .79 .91 .00 .58 .89
5b .97 .92 .91 .00 .12 .73 .00 .01 .55 .01 .77 .87 .00 .51 .84
D
e
n
se
N
e
t 3a .97 .95 .94 .00 .37 .83 .00 .02 .69 .00 .86 .92 .00 .72 .90
3b .97 .93 .92 .00 .18 .76 .00 .01 .62 .00 .78 .89 .00 .49 .85
5a .97 .90 .93 .00 .27 .78 .00 .02 .58 .00 .77 .91 .00 .56 .87
5b .97 .92 .91 .00 .30 .75 .00 .03 .58 .00 .80 .89 .00 .60 .84
Table 3: Accuracies in countering 4 strong attacks at 2 strength levels (PGD-L∞,
PGD-L2, MIA-L∞, MIA-L2), using 2 CNN architectures as unprotected model
M across 4 class sets. UnMask (“UM”) provides significantly better protection
than adversarial training (“AT”), 31.18% on average. “None” means no defense.
UnMask’s defense ability. Similar trends can be observed across many of the
attacks. In addition, Table 3 highlights that UnMask is agnostic to the deep
learning model that is being protected (ResNet50 vs DenseNet121), as measured
by the ability of UnMask to infer an adversarial images’ actual class.
It is interesting to observe that MIA-L∞ is more effective at breaking the
UnMask defense. We believe this could be due to the single-step attacks’ better
transferability, which has been reported in prior work [22]. We also note the
fact that UnMask’s accuracy could be higher than the un-attacked model M if
model K learns a better representation of the data through the feature masks
as opposed to model M , which trains on the images directly.
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Fig. 3. UnMask’s effectiveness in detecting 4 strong attacks at two strength levels.
UnMask’s protection may not be affected strictly based on the number of classes.
Rather, an important factor is the feature overlap among classes. UnMask provides
better detection when there are 5 classes (dark orange; 23.53% overlap) than when
there are 3 (light blue; 50% overlap). Keeping the number of classes constant and
varying their feature overlap also supports our observation about the role of feature
overlap (e.g., CS3a at 6.89% vs. CS3b at 50%). Dotted line indicates random guessing.
Evaluating Detection of Attacks To evaluate UnMask’s effectiveness in de-
tecting adversarial images, we set the contamination level to 0.5—meaning half
of the images are benign and the other half are adversarial. Figure 3 summa-
rizes UnMask’s detection effectiveness, using receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) curves constructed by varying the adversarial-benign threshold t. The
curves show UnMask’s performance across operating points as measured by
the tradeoff between true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) rates. Table 2
shows the number of images used to test the detection ability of UnMask. Only
images that are successfully attacked are used for evaluation (combined with
benign counterparts), thus the variations in numbers.
An interesting characteristic of UnMask’s protection is that its effectiveness
may not be affected strictly based on the number of classes in the dataset as in
conventional classification tasks. Rather, an important factor is how much feature
overlap there is among the classes. The ROC curves in Figure 3 illustrate this
phenomenon, where UnMask provides better detection when there are 5 classes
(Figure 3, dark orange) than when there are 3 classes (light blue). As shown in
Table 1, the 5-class setup (CS5a—dark orange) has a feature overlap of 23.53%
across the the 5 classes’ 34 unique features, while the 3-class setup (CS3b—light
blue) has 50% overlap. Keeping the number of classes constant and varying their
feature overlap also supports this observation about the role of feature overlap
(e.g., CS3a vs. CS3b in Figure 3).
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For a given feature overlap level, UnMask performs similarly across attack
methods. When examining feature overlap 6.89% (CS3a) on DenseNet121, Un-
Mask attains AUC scores of 0.95, 0.958, 0.968, 0.967, 0.962, 0.961, 0.969 and
0.967 on attacks PGD-L∞ (=8/16), PGD-L2 (=300/600), MIA-L∞ (=8/16)
and MIA-L2 (=300/600), respectively. This result is significant because it high-
lights the ability of UnMask to operate against multiple strong attack strategies
to achieve high detection success rate. As a representative ROC operating point
for the attack vectors, we use MIA-L2 (=300) on feature overlap 6.89%. In
this scenario, UnMask is able to detect up to 96.75% of attacks with a false
positive rate of 9.66%. We believe that performing well in a low feature overlap
environment is all that is required. This is because in many circumstances it is
not important to distinguish the exact class (e.g., dog or cat) of the image, but
whether the image is being completely misclassified (e.g., car vs. person). There-
fore, in practice, classes can be selected such that feature overlap is minimized.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new method for semantically aligning ro-
bust features with human intuition, and showed how it protects deep learning
models against adversarial attacks through the UnMask detection and defense
framework. Through extensive evaluation, we analyze the merits of UnMask’s
ability to detect attacks—finding up to 96.75% of attacks with a false positive
rate of 9.66%; and defend deep learning models—correctly classifying up to 93%
of adversarial images in the gray-box scenario. UnMask provides significantly
better protection than adversarial training across 8 attack vectors, averaging
31.18% higher accuracy. Our proposed method is fast and architecture-agnostic.
We expect our approach to be one of multiple techniques used in concert to
provide comprehensive protection. Fortunately, our proposed technique can be
readily integrated with many existing techniques, as it operates in parallel to
the deep learning model that it aims to protect.
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Appendix
In the supplemental appendix we provide additional information on the ex-
perimental setup in Section 1; selection of the adversarial training parameter,
, in Section 2; conversion of the PASCAL-Part dataset for use in the Un-
MaskDataset in Section 3; and information on how to setup and run the
open-sourced code and models presented in this paper in Section 4.
1 Detailed Experiment Setup
All experiments were tested in a Linux environment using Python 3, on 2 Nvidia
Titan X GPUs, a Titan RTX and an Nvidia DGX. We note that a single Nvidia
GPU is sufficient to recreate all of the experiments, however, we recommend that
the GPU has at least 12GB of memory (not tested with less). Anaconda 3 is used
to manage all the Python packages. To facilitate reproducibility of the Python
environment, we release an Anaconda YAML specification file of the libraries
utilized in the experiments. This allows the user to create a new virtual Python
environment with all of the packages required to run the code by importing the
YAML file. In addition, we use multiple Github repositories in the code base—
(i) for the Mask R-CNN model [1] and (ii) to assist in the development of the
UnMaskDataset 3. Since there are significant modifications from the original
implementation, it’s necessary for the user to utilize the provided version.
2 Adversarial Training: Finding Train Epsilon
We follow standard procedure and determine the optimal  on a per-dataset
basis (class set in our case) [26], conducting a line search across ={1, 2, 4, 6,
8, 16}. We select the  with best generalization performance on the validation
set, for each class set (e.g., cs3a, cs5b). We find that =4, provides the best
performance across each class sets, as seen in Figure 4. While =6 appears to
be a good choice for class set CS3a, it has poor generalization performance and
overfits to PGD-L∞. This can be seen through the bar chart of Figure 5, where
selecting an  greater than 4 reduces the generalization of adversarial training
to all other attack vectors. For this reason, we select =4 for all class sets.
3 We utilized part of the following repositories to convert the PASCAL-Part dataset
to Microsoft COCO format: I
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Fig. 4. Line search for adversarial training parameter  on validation data. We select
=4, since it provides the best performance on most attacks.
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Fig. 5. Detailed bar chart describing the performance of  across all attack vectors. We
select =4, since it provides the best performance on most attacks.
3 Extended UnMaskDataset Information
In Table A4, the class-feature matrix describes the features contained by each
class in the dataset. In Table A5, we can see that the features in the Un-
MaskDataset are a generalization of the ones in PASCAL-Part. For example,
the PASCAL-Part dataset has 18 variations of the leg feature, however, in order
to create a model that better generalizes, we combine this to a single leg feature.
We note that in Table A4, that two features have multiple sub-features con-
densed into a single feature (not listed due to space constraints). These features
are: vehicle: {vehicle left, vehicle right, vehicle top, vehicle back} and coach:
{coach left, coach right, coach back, coach top, coach front}. In addition, we
note that there is a minor error in the conversion of the handlebar feature in the
bike and motorcycle class (handlebar features were labeled as hand). However,
since those classes are not utilized in the experiments, the effects are minimized.
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Arm
Beak
Body
Cap
Coach
Door
Engine
Ear
Eye
Eyebrow
Foot
Front side
Hair
Hand
Head
Headlight
Hoof
Horn
Leg
License plate
Mirror
Mouth
Muzzle
Neck
Nose
Paw
Plant
Pot
Saddle
Screen
Stern
Tail
Torso
Vehicle
Wheel
Window
Wing
Class Set (CS)
CS3a
CS3b
CS5a
CS5b
Table A4: Class-Feature Matrix. Top: dots mark classes’ features. Bottom: four
class sets with varying levels of feature overlap. Features vehicle and coach have
sub-features not listed here due to space (see Table A5).
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4 Code and Models
We open-source all of the code, data and models used in this paper. Below, we
provide a walk-through of how to set up the environment and run the code locally.
For additional information, and the steps necessary to train a custom feature
extraction model K, we provide a detailed walk through on Github (https://
github.com/unmaskd/unmask).
Setup. Below are the steps the user should take in order to set up their
environment for running the code:
1. Set up a Linux environment (not tested for Windows) with an Nvidia GPU
containing at least 12GB of memory (less may work, but not tested).
2. Download the open-sourced code, dataset and models from Github.
3. Create a virtual Python environment using the provided YAML configura-
tion file on Github.
4. Activate the new virtual Python environment
Running the code. Once the environment is set up, we can control the
experiment parameters from the config.py file and run the code in main.py.
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UnMaskDataset PASCAL-Part Dataset
Arm Right upper arm, right lower arm, left upper arm, left lower arm
Beak Beak
Body Body
Cap Cap
Coach back Coach back (1-1)
Coach front Coach front (1-9)
Coach left Coach left (1-9)
Coach right Coach right (1-8)
Coach top Coach top (1-4)
Door Door (1-4)
Engine Engine (1-6)
Ear Left ear, right ear
Eye Left eye, right eye
Eyebrow Left eyebrow, right eyebrow
Foot Left foot, right foot
Front side Front side
Hair Hair
Hand Left hand, right hand
Head Head
Headlight Left headlight (1-8)
Hoof Left back hoof, left front hoof, right back hoof, right front hoof
Horn Left horn, right horn
Leg Lower left leg, right front lower leg, right lower leg, left leg, left front leg,
left front lower leg, right front upper leg, right back upper leg, left upper
leg, left back upper leg, right leg, right back lower leg, right front leg, left
back leg, right back leg, right upper leg, left back lower leg, left front upper
leg
License plate Back license plate, front license plate
Mirror Left mirror, right mirror
Mouth Mouth
Muzzle Muzzle
Neck Neck
Nose Nose
Paw Left back paw, left front paw, right back paw, right front paw
Plant Plant
Pot Pot
Saddle Saddle
Screen Screen
Stern Stern
Tail Tail
Torso Torso
Vehicle back Vehicle back
Vehicle front Vehicle front
Vehicle left Vehicle left
Vehicle right Vehicle right
Wheel Wheel (1-8), back wheel, chainwheel, front wheel
Window Window (1-20)
Wing Left wing, right wing
Table A5: Feature mapping from PASCAL-Part to the UnMaskDataset. We
use the notation “part (1-x)” to indicate that the PASCAL-Part dataset labeled
the feature as ‘x’ separate feature labels. We also note that the PASCAL-Part
utilizes a more dense label notation, which we re-label in the table for ease of
reading. For example, right front lower leg is abbreviated ‘rflleg’ in PASCAL-
Part.
